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THE SUPREME COURT’S LANDMARK DECISION IN NEW
PRIME INC. V. OLIVEIRA: A PANOPTIC VIEW OF
AMERICA’S CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ARBITRATION
Imre S. Szalai *
INTRODUCTION
Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a historic, unanimous
decision in the case of New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira. 1 This case, on its surface,
involves the trucking industry and a focused issue of arbitration law. However,
on a deeper level, the New Prime decision raises fundamental questions about
America’s civil justice system and how our society should resolve disputes. This
Essay situates the New Prime decision using three different viewpoints: the past,
present, and future. Through the lens of New Prime, one can see the overall,
sweeping trajectory and potential future role of arbitration within America’s
civil justice system.
Viewed from the perspective of the past, and as explained in section II.A of
this Essay, the New Prime decision stands apart as representing the first decision
in several decades where the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of workers and
rejected an expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 2 a
statute which plays a central role in our civil justice system. This sparse statute,
enacted in 1925 for limited purposes, regulates and facilitates the resolution of
disputes through arbitration. 3 However, since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has
in effect rewritten and expanded the FAA, transforming America’s civil justice
system in the process. 4 Compared to the last several decades of Supreme Court

*
Judge John D. Wessel Distinguished Professor of Social Justice, Loyola University New Orleans
College of Law; Yale University, B.A.; Columbia University, J.D. The Author served as an amicus curiae in the
New Prime case before the Supreme Court. The Author would like to thank the following people for their
feedback and assistance in reviewing this Essay: Rebecca Alvarez, Ajeet S. Badesha, Michael K. Blackwell,
Alexandra E. Celio, Tristan A. Chandra, Kendall E. Clark, Dalita M. Collins, Caleb N. Dorrance, Avery P.
Dubois, Justin J. Fitch, Lindsey R. Freihoff, Jeffrey C. Gasser, Jelvee L. Gozly, Derek M. Graves, Elizabeth C.
Griffin, Christopher L. Kerrigan, Maeghen E. Kling, Claire T. Lansden, Ayisha I. Lawrence, Chasity M.
Matthews, Monica Mendoza, Obinna Moneme, Angel J. Salome, Laura T. Sanchez Fowler, Alberto E. Silva,
Paul J. Smith, Matthew J. Succi, Vladimir D. Thomas, Warner B. Thompson, Constance E. Tullier, Bianca L.
Velez, Trevor S. Wieprecht, and Trey M. Williams. Any errors remain the Author’s own.
1
139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
2
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
3
See generally id.
4
Imre S. Szalai, The Consent Amendment: Restoring Meaningful Consent and Respect for Human
Dignity in America’s Civil Justice System, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 195, 204–07 (2017) (describing the
Supreme Court’s transformation of the FAA).
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cases involving the FAA, the New Prime decision represents a new, more literal,
restrained interpretation of this critical statute. 5
As further explored in section II.B, one can also understand the New Prime
decision in the context of the current sociopolitical environment in which it was
issued. In the wake of the #MeToo movement, a public backlash has developed
against the widespread use of forced arbitration in America, with bipartisan
support for legislative reforms as well as some private initiatives to cut back on
the use of arbitration. 6 Further, the contentious confirmation hearings of Justice
Brett Kavanaugh and President Donald J. Trump’s attacks on the judiciary have
raised questions about partisanship and the independence of the judiciary. 7 The
unanimous New Prime decision and its curtailment of arbitration arguably
reflect the particular environment in which it was issued. 8
Looking ahead to the future, and as explained in section II.C of this Essay,
the New Prime case can solve some problems involving the FAA and raise
several others. First, New Prime suggests a new approach courts may use to finetune the existing legal framework of the FAA. There are conflicting decisions
involving multiple different aspects of arbitration law 9—and fixing arbitration
law is a pressing need in light of the hundreds of millions of arbitration clauses
that have proliferated in American society. 10 The Court’s analysis in New Prime
suggests a new judicial approach that can be used to fix the legal framework for
arbitration. 11 Second, this final section about the future discusses how New
Prime raises larger questions about the scope of the FAA and which workers are
exempt from its coverage, and workers in the gig economy, such as Uber and
Lyft drivers, could be impacted and no longer forced to arbitrate. 12 Third, this
Essay concludes by examining fundamental questions raised by New Prime, like
what the future role of arbitration in America’s civil justice system should be,

5

See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017);
Kerri Anne Renzulli, Workers at Google, Facebook, eBay and Airbnb Can Now Sue over Sexual Harassment—
Here’s What that Means for Employees, CNBC (Nov. 19, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/19/
google-facebook-airbnb-employees-can-now-sue-over-sexual-harassment.html.
7
Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama Judge’, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.
html; Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion, All the Ways a Justice Kavanaugh Would Have to Recuse Himself, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/opinion/justice-kavanaugh-recuse-himself.html.
8
See infra Section II.B.
9
See infra Section II.C.1.
10
See generally Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s
Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233 (2019).
11
See infra Section II.C.1.
12
See infra Section II.C.2.
6
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whether Congress should curb the use of arbitration, access to justice, and
federalism. 13
The Supreme Court’s New Prime decision is a major milestone, and as
explored below, it unveils a panoptic, sweeping view of the past, present, and
future role of arbitration in America’s civil justice system.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING IN NEW PRIME

Before discussing deeper implications of New Prime, this Part provides
some background regarding the case and the Supreme Court’s holding. The New
Prime case involves the trucking industry, which is critical to the economy and
the entire retail industry in America. 14 Unfortunately, abusive, predatory
practices involving dangerous conditions and crushing debt have been welldocumented in this industry, and truckers have been described as “modern-day
indentured servants.” 15
Mr. Dominic Oliveira, the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit, is a truck driver
who hauled freight for New Prime, Inc., an interstate trucking company. 16 Mr.
Oliveira first worked for New Prime as an “apprentice” and completed 10,000
miles of driving while being paid nothing. 17 Next, he worked for New Prime as
a “driver trainee” for the next 30,000 miles of driving, while being paid less than
minimum wage. 18 Then, when Mr. Oliveira finally became a regular driver for
New Prime, he leased a truck from a company closely related to New Prime. 19
He also was required to buy insurance, fuel, locks, and other equipment from
New Prime’s store, and New Prime made regular deductions from his paycheck
for the lease payments and purchases. 20 Due to these deductions, Mr. Oliveira’s
paycheck was negative on several occasions. 21

13

See infra Section II.C.3.
Rachel Premack, There’s a Critical Shortage of Truck Drivers in the US, and It’s Causing Everything
from Delayed Amazon Orders to More Expensive Groceries, BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2018, 3:52 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/truck-driver-shortage-slowing-amazon-orders-increasing-retail-prices-20185.
15
Brett Murphy, Rigged, USA TODAY (June 16, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/
news/rigged-forced-into-debt-worked-past-exhaustion-left-with-nothing/.
16
Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2017).
17
Id.
18
Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 125, 128 (D. Mass. 2015).
19
Id. at 128, 129.
20
Id. at 129.
21
Id.
14
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Mr. Oliveira eventually filed a class action in federal court against New
Prime for failure to pay minimum wage under state and federal law, breach of
contract, and violations of other laws. 22 In response to this lawsuit, New Prime
asked the court to force Mr. Oliveira into private, individual arbitration, which
would have ended his class action in court. 23 Like tens of millions of other
workers in the United States, 24 Mr. Oliveira was purportedly bound by an
arbitration clause in his contract with New Prime. 25 However, the federal district
court, 26 the First Circuit, 27 and ultimately, the Supreme Court decided not to
enforce the arbitration clause under federal law. 28
Turning to the applicable legal standards, the FAA generally declares that
arbitration agreements are fully binding. 29 Through different mechanisms—like
summary hearings, orders to compel arbitration, and judicial confirmation of
arbitrators’ awards—the FAA helps facilitate the resolution of disputes through
arbitration. 30 At first glance, it seems that the FAA requires enforcement of Mr.
Oliveira’s arbitration agreement. However, the FAA contains an important
limitation involving specifically identified workers.
The first section of the FAA, which contains some key definitions and
limitations, states that nothing in the statute “shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” 31—the so-called transportation
worker exemption. In 2001, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme
Court construed this exemption narrowly to refer to contracts of employment of
transportation workers, not all employment contracts. 32 As a result, the FAA

22

New Prime, 857 F.3d at 11.
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 536 (2019); New Prime, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 128–29
(containing text of arbitration agreement).
24
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 4–
5 (2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration/; IMRE S. SZALAI, THE EMP.
RIGHTS ADVOCACY INST. FOR LAW & POLICY, THE WIDESPREAD USE OF WORKPLACE ARBITRATION AMONG
AMERICA’S TOP 100 COMPANIES 2 (2017), http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
Insitute-2017-Report-Widespread-Use-Of-Workplace-Arbitration.pdf.
25
New Prime, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 128–29.
26
See generally id. at 125.
27
See generally New Prime, 857 F.3d at 7.
28
See generally New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 532.
29
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
30
Id. § 4 (providing for an order compelling arbitration and the possibility of a focused jury trial on the
making of an arbitration agreement); id. § 6 (providing that FAA applications generally “shall be made and heard
in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions”); id. § 9 (confirmation of arbitral awards).
31
Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
32
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
23
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generally covers all workers, but “transportation workers” are carved out and
exempt from the FAA’s arbitration requirement. 33
In the wake of Circuit City, a circuit split developed regarding the meaning
of the phrase “contracts of employment” in the FAA’s transportation worker
exemption. 34 Does this phrase “contracts of employment” refer exclusively to
the employer–employee relationship, as opposed to contracts involving
independent contractors? Or does the phrase “contracts of employment” refer
more broadly to all types of transportation workers, including employees and
independent contractors? Several district courts had held that the exemption
applied to transportation workers who were employees, but not independent
contractors. 35 In contrast, the First Circuit in its New Prime decision reached the
opposite result and held that the exemption broadly covered all transportation
workers, both employees and independent contractors. 36
A related split developed concerning whether the transportation worker
exemption is applied by a court or arbitrator. The Ninth Circuit held that only a
court could determine whether the transportation worker exemption applied, and
the First Circuit in New Prime adopted the same holding. 37 However, the Eighth
Circuit took the opposite view and held that parties could delegate to the
arbitrator whether the transportation worker exemption applied. 38
In January 2019, the Supreme Court resolved these conflicts involving the
transportation worker exemption and issued its 8–0 unanimous decision in New
Prime, written by Justice Gorsuch. 39 Regarding the “who decides” question—
whether a court or arbitrator would construe the transportation worker
exemption—the Supreme Court held that courts should decide whether the
exemption applied. 40 The Court reasoned that because not all contracts are
covered by the FAA, a court’s power to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA
is limited. 41 Section 1 of the FAA helps define the scope of the entire FAA and
exempts from the FAA’s coverage contracts of employment of transportation
33

Id.
Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 17–18, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (collecting, and ultimately rejecting,
several court decisions finding that independent-contractor agreements are not contracts of employment for
purposes of the transportation worker exemption).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 22.
37
Id. at 15; In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2011).
38
Green v. SuperShuttle, Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011).
39
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537, 543–44 (2019). Justice Kavanaugh, who had just
joined the Court, did not participate. Id. at 532, 544.
40
Id. at 537.
41
Id. at 537–38.
34
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workers. 42 The Supreme Court reasoned that before a court could invoke the
power of the FAA to send a dispute to an arbitrator, a court must first assess
whether the FAA applies to the particular contract. 43 As a result, courts must
decide the antecedent question of whether the transportation worker exemption
applies to a particular contract. 44
In reaching its decision regarding independent contractors, the New Prime
Court relied on a canon of statutory construction providing that terms should be
construed today as having the same meaning when Congress first enacted the
statute. 45 Based on its examination of historical documents using the phrase
“contract of employment”—like old dictionaries, cases, and statutes from the
late 1800s and early 1900s—the Court concluded that this phrase in the
transportation worker exemption was not limited to the employer–employee
relationship and instead included the concept of an independent contractor. 46
Additionally, the Court emphasized that the FAA’s text refers to contracts of
employment of “workers,” not the more limited term “employees.” 47 The Court
thought that Congress in 1925 used the particular, more expansive term
“workers” in the FAA “in a broad sense to capture any contract for the
performance of work by workers,” including independent contractors. 48 Because
the FAA’s transportation worker exemption applied broadly to all transportation
workers, regardless of their status as independent contractors or employees, the
Supreme Court ultimately held there was no authority under the FAA to compel
arbitration of Mr. Oliveira’s claims. 49 The FAA was simply inapplicable to Mr.
Oliveira’s contract as a transportation worker. 50

42

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
44
Id. at 537.
45
Id. at 539.
46
Id. at 539–44.
47
Id. at 541.
48
Id. (emphasis in original).
49
Id. at 544.
50
Id. Justice Ginsburg, who joined the Court’s decision, issued a short concurring opinion. Id. at 544
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). She observed that as a general rule, a word in a statute should take on the meaning of
the word at the time of the statute’s enactment, and it was therefore appropriate to examine materials from the
time period surrounding the FAA’s enactment. Id. However, she cautioned that Congress may sometimes design
a statute to “govern changing times and circumstances.” Id. (recognizing antitrust laws, RICO, and the Securities
Exchange Act as examples of statutes that should be interpreted as having a “dynamic,” “changing content”).
43
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THE NEW PRIME DECISION, SITUATED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE

A. New Prime Viewed Through the Lens of the Past
Looking back to the origins of the FAA, one can see how the Supreme Court
has radically transformed the FAA over the decades. As has been extensively
documented, Congress originally intended the statute to have a limited scope. 51
Prior to the 1920s, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were generally not
enforceable, and the FAA was designed to reverse the previous judicial hostility
against the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 52 The FAA’s original goal
was to place arbitration agreements on the “same footing” as other contracts so
that arbitration agreements became enforceable like any other term of a
contract. 53 Also, the statute was originally designed to cover arbitration of
contractual claims between parties engaged in interstate shipments crossing state
lines, 54 and the FAA, as a procedural rule, would only govern in federal court
proceedings. 55 Furthermore, the statute was intended to govern the
enforceability of negotiated, voluntary arbitration agreements, not take-it-orleave-it agreements, 56 and the drafters of the FAA added a special exception to
clarify that no workers, in any field, would be covered by the statute. 57 For the
first few decades of its existence, the FAA was generally interpreted and applied
as intended. 58
51
Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP.
RESOL. 115, 117–22 (2016); Imre Stephen Szalai, More than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion
and American Express on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 56 (2014). See generally
IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013).
52
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 19–20 (1992) (observing that although pre-FAA laws were supportive of arbitration,
there was a “relative lack of enforceability of such agreements before an award was made”).
53
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (explaining that the FAA’s purpose is to place arbitration agreements
“upon the same footing as other contracts”).
54
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (limiting coverage of the FAA to agreements “to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract”); Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements
for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or
Territories on with Foreign Nations: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on
the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (FAA designed for disputes such as one arising from an interstate shipment
of a carload of potatoes between a seller in Wyoming and a dealer in New Jersey).
55
See generally MACNEIL, supra note 52.
56
A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce; and a Bill to Make
Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of Contracts,
Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Hearings on S.
4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–10 (1923).
57
See generally SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE, supra note 51.
58
Compare, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (statutory claims not arbitrable), with
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (statutory claims are arbitrable);
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But this modest scope and purpose did not last. The Supreme Court has
changed the FAA on several different levels, such as by expanding its scope and
applicability; developing special pro-arbitration tests and presumptions; and
imbuing the statute with special preemptive powers. For example, as to its scope
and applicability, the Supreme Court since the 1980s has grossly and
erroneously expanded the statute so that it controls in both federal and state
court; 59 provides for the enforceability of take-it-or-leave-it, adhesionary
agreements to arbitrate; 60 and generally covers all types of statutory claims 61 and
employment disputes. 62 Instead of placing arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts—the original intent behind the FAA 63—arbitration
agreements now have a demigod status with special protections and
presumptions developed by the Court inapplicable to other contracts. 64 The
Supreme Court has found in the FAA a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, 65 but this policy is manufactured by the Court and not found
anywhere in the text or history of the FAA. 66 Moreover, the FAA now has a
super-preemptive status, overriding state laws of general applicability that are
perceived as having a “disproportionate impact” on arbitration. 67 At this current
stage of its development, the FAA has been held to displace state tribunals
specially designed to have exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims based on state
law. 68 Over the decades, the Supreme Court has held that the FAA overrides
numerous state laws, 69 and recently, even an agreement between parties as
interpreted under state contract law by a state court. 70 The application of the

also compare, e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657, 664–65 (Neb. 1950) (FAA
does not control in state court proceedings), with Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (FAA
governs in state court proceedings).
59
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
60
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 n.5 (2011).
61
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483.
62
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
63
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (setting forth a broad preemption test under the FAA, which overrides
any state law that undermines arbitration).
65
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that the FAA
embodies a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”).
66
The FAA’s text simply declares that arbitration agreements are binding, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), and the
text does not require any doubts be resolved in favor of arbitration. But see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460
U.S. at 24–25 (holding that, in light of the purported federal policy in favor of arbitration, doubts in interpreting
the scope of an arbitration clause must be resolved in favor of arbitration).
67
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 342.
68
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 352–53, 359 (2008) (relying on national policy favoring arbitration
and overriding exclusive jurisdiction of state administrative agency).
69
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
70
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
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FAA to state courts raises serious federalism concerns and should be
unconstitutional. 71
As another example of a pro-arbitration doctrine, the Court held that an
employee seeking to avoid arbitration must first lodge a legal attack against a
mini-arbitration agreement within a larger arbitration agreement, and pursuant
to this mini-agreement, the employee purportedly agreed to arbitrate whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate. 72 Most people are probably unaware of arbitration
clauses or do not understand their significance; thus, assessing whether an
employee agreed to arbitrate whether they agreed to arbitration sounds comical.
Because of this case, courts have lost a degree of supervision or monitoring over
the fairness of arbitration clauses before sending a dispute to arbitration, and
some courts are in effect merely rubber-stamping arbitration agreements. 73
Examining the transition of the FAA from its humble, limited beginnings
during the 1920s to today, one sees that today’s FAA has become an allencompassing, all-powerful, overriding statute. One can summarize the last few
decades of the Supreme Court’s FAA decisions with a simple mantra: Thou
Shalt Arbitrate! However, the pro-arbitration results from these Supreme Court
cases sometimes require the acceptance of fictional doctrines; 74 a willingness to
turn a blind eye to the text, history, and policy of the statute; 75 and ignoring
constitutional violations. 76
Given the troubled history of the Supreme Court’s judicial expansion of the
modern FAA—a development which has been so extreme that it would be
almost comedic if not for its impact on justice and virtually every area of
American law—the oral argument in New Prime was remarkable. During oral
argument, the Justices seemed more skeptical and critical of the employer’s
arguments, and not as much of the worker’s arguments. 77 The questions of
Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts appeared to favor the worker’s
view, 78 and normally, with their conservative and pro-business tendencies, one
would expect that they would be inclined to favor the employer in this case. With
71

See MACNEIL, supra note 52.
Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010).
73
Szalai, More than Class Action Killers, supra note 51, at 33–34.
74
Jackson, 561 U.S. at 70–71 (fictionally treating an arbitration clause as separable from the rest of the
contract).
75
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133–40 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21–36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
76
See MACNEIL, supra note 52.
77
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–10, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019)
(No. 17-340).
78
See, e.g., id.
72
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Justice Kavanaugh not having been confirmed yet, and considering the past
trajectory of expansive, twisted FAA interpretations, original expectations may
have forecasted a 4–4 split vote along conservative and liberal lines prior to oral
argument. However, immediately after oral argument, some commentators
asked if this could be the first time in decades the Court would rule in favor of
workers by rejecting an expansive interpretation of the FAA. 79
Despite these cautiously optimistic expectations, the Court’s decision in New
Prime was jaw-dropping. The Supreme Court’s decades-long, steady, proarbitration march finally hit a roadblock—the text of the FAA. Not only was the
ultimate result in New Prime blindsiding compared to the Court’s prior FAA
decisions, but the Supreme Court’s method of interpreting the FAA in New
Prime was jarring as well. In a nutshell, the approach used in New Prime is more
textual and more comprehensive. A review of Justice Gorsuch’s FAA decisions
when he was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, showed
a similarly “piercingly textual” approach. 80 At the time, some predicted that his
nomination to the Court could potentially bring about a shift in the FAA’s
interpretation, 81 and that shift occurred in New Prime. Justice Gorsuch’s textual
interpretation of the FAA when he was sitting on the Tenth Circuit foreshadowed
the approach he used in New Prime. 82
The Court examined the FAA more comprehensively than in the past by
looking at how its various sections fit together—it distanced itself from its past
approach, which sometimes examined parts of the statute in isolation or in a
piecemeal fashion in order to implement the Court’s pro-arbitration policy. 83
While prior Supreme Court decisions ignored key language in the FAA, 84 the
Court in New Prime tried to take into account all relevant language. For example,
the Court highlighted the word “nothing” in Section 1 of the FAA to stress that

79
E.g., Imre Szalai, A Shift in SCOTUS’s Interpretation of the FAA?, OUTSOURCING JUST. (Oct. 6, 2018),
http://www.outsourcingjustice.com/new-prime-oliveira-arbitration-case/.
80
Amanda Bronstad, Neil Gorsuch ‘Piercingly Textual’ and Often Pro-Defense on Class Actions and
Arbitration, LAW.COM (Feb. 28, 2017, 03:15 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/02/28/neilgorsuch-piercingly-textual-and-often-pro-defense-on-class-actions-and-arbitration/; Imre Szalai, Supreme
Court Nominee Gorsuch and Arbitration Law, OUTSOURCING JUST. (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.
outsourcingjustice.com/gorsuch-arbitration-law/ (describing Justice Gorsuch’s analysis of the FAA on the Tenth
Circuit as piercingly textual).
81
Szalai, supra note 80.
82
See, e.g., Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, L.P., 748 F.3d 975, 977, 984 (10th Cir. 2014); Chelsea Family
Pharmacy, PLLC v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 567 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). The Author discussed
Justice Gorsuch’s textual approach in these Tenth Circuit cases when he was first nominated to the Supreme
Court. Szalai, supra note 80.
83
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
84
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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“nothing” in the entire statute was intended to apply to transportation workers. 85
And the Court took a more comprehensive view of the statute by articulating
that each section of the FAA should not be read in isolation, but as integrated
parts of a unified statute. According to the Court, “Sections 1, 2, and 3 [and 4]
are integral parts of a whole, [and Sections] 1 and 2 define the field in which
Congress was legislating.” 86 To reach its conclusion, the Court construed
different sections of the FAA as an integrated whole.
Furthermore, to help reinforce its interpretation of key language, the Court
examined the broader history surrounding the enactment of the statute, such as
the fact that Congress likely wanted the transportation worker exemption
because “in 1925, Congress had already prescribed alternative employment
dispute resolution regimes for many transportation workers.” 87 The Court also
recognized it could not imbue “old statutory terms with new meanings.” 88 The
Court cited dictionaries, cases, and statutes from the time period to carefully
determine what Congress likely meant in 1925 when it adopted the words
“contracts of employment” in the FAA. 89
Throughout the opinion, the New Prime Court appeared to strive, in good
faith, to ascertain the correct, original meaning of the statute at the time Congress
enacted the FAA so that the Court would not overstep its boundaries and change
what Congress had originally enacted. 90 In fact, the analysis in New Prime was
so sharply textual and originalist, especially compared to prior FAA decisions,
that Justice Ginsburg perhaps felt uncomfortable and compelled to write a
separate concurring opinion, in which she emphasized that such a strong
textualist approach may not always be appropriate. 91
The approach used in New Prime for analyzing the FAA—which could be
described as textualist, statutory originalist, 92 and more comprehensive—was
striking compared to the Court’s prior FAA decisions. Over the years, the
Supreme Court has issued several pro-arbitration FAA decisions, completely at
odds with the policy, text, original meaning, and history of the statute. 93 For
85

New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).
Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
87
Id. at 537.
88
Id. at 539.
89
Id. at 539–40.
90
Id. at 542–43.
91
Id. at 544.
92
Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning
the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 812 (1994) (“[T]he fundamental
objective of originalist statutory interpretation is to give effect to the wishes of the enacting legislature.”).
93
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
86
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example, had New Prime been issued when Justice Scalia was still on the bench,
the Court would have probably issued a 5–4 decision along the following lines:
We have described the FAA as embodying a strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In light of this principle, the Court has
already construed the Section 1 exemption narrowly. Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). To avoid disrupting the
expectations of contracting parties like the businesses that draft
arbitration agreements (companies have rights too; see Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)), we must be consistent
and construe the exemption narrowly here instead of adopting the
broad, unsupported view advocated by the respondent.
Turning to the text of statute, which always should guide our
analysis, the statute only exempts “contracts of employment,” and
respondent has not demonstrated how this plain language concerning
employment can be expanded beyond the employer–employee
relationship. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Try as he may, respondent wishes us
to rewrite the Section 1 exemption to explicitly mention “independent
contractors,” which is nothing short of ludicrous. The FAA never uses
the term “independent contractor,” and we cannot look at the scant
legislative history in this case because the plain language of the statute
is clear.
Even if there was some ambiguity in the language justifying a quick
peek at the legislative history (there is not), respondent has not brought
anything to our attention from the FAA’s sparse legislative history
demonstrating that Congress intended to cover independent
contractors with the exemption. If Congress had so desired, it could
have—and still can—explicitly exclude independent contractors from
the scope of the FAA. Contrary to the dissent’s view, the Justices of
this Court cannot invent new exceptions to the FAA, a venerable,
almost 100-year-old statute.
Truth to tell, our prior cases involving statutory arbitrability,
preemption, and severability all but resolve this case. We have already
held that every type of claim is arbitrable. Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Nothing in the text,
history, or purpose of the employment or wage statutes at issue in this
case would prevent the respondent’s claims from being heard by an
arbitrator. Id. Additionally, respondent’s fanciful interpretation, which
is pure applesauce and has no basis in the text of the statute, would
have a disproportionate impact on the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and undermine the efficiency of arbitration. The FAA
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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would override such an interpretation. See AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Moreover, as demonstrated by the
contract’s terms, respondent wished for an arbitrator to resolve all
disputes regarding the arbitration clause, including whether he must
arbitrate. We are not at liberty to adopt respondent’s interpretive
jiggery-pokery and in effect rewrite his contract to cut back on an
arbitrator’s powers.
Because arbitration is a matter of contract, and because respondent
personally agreed to arbitrate arbitrability and did not challenge the
delegation clause specifically, Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561
U.S. 63 (2010), all of respondent’s claims and arguments are subject
to arbitration.

The Supreme Court could have easily manufactured the erroneous result
above, following in what Justice O’Connor called an unconstitutional, deeply
troubling, long tradition of “abandon[ing] all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” 94 New Prime is significant
because the decision, with its strong textualist, statutory originalist, and more
comprehensive approach to interpreting the FAA, represents a sharp break from
prior FAA decisions.
The Court’s prior FAA decisions show that the Court relied on a purported
policy in favor of arbitration to override or ignore the text of the FAA. New
Prime is notable for emphasizing that policy goals, and the Supreme Court’s
preference for arbitration in particular, should not drive the Court’s decisions. In
response to a policy argument raised by New Prime, the Court explained:
But often and by design it is “hard-fought compromise[],” not cold
logic, that supplies the solvent needed for a bill to survive the
legislative process. If courts felt free to pave over bumpy statutory
texts in the name of more expeditiously advancing a policy goal, we
would risk failing to “tak[e] . . . account of” legislative compromises
essential to a law’s passage and, in that way, thwart rather than honor
“the effectuation of congressional intent.” 95

The Court in New Prime recognized that statutory language, even though it may
appear “bumpy” or not the result of “cold logic,” is often the result of legislative

94
95

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 (citation omitted).
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compromise. 96 As a result, courts should not ignore the text of a statute in the
name of policy. 97
But had the Court followed this approach in its prior FAA decisions, we
would have a different-looking and more limited FAA today. 98 New Prime is
notable not only for being the first case in decades where the Court rejects an
expansive interpretation of the FAA, but also for suggesting a new, more
restrained approach in interpreting the FAA that examines the entire statute and
involves textualism and statutory originalism.
B. Understanding New Prime as a Product of Its Current Environment
The New Prime decision can also be understood as reflecting current
sociopolitical movements. For example, one can view this case through the
broader lens of the #MeToo movement. Forced arbitration of employment
disputes and statutory claims can help conceal wrongdoing in the workplace. 99
In the wake of #MeToo, there have been bipartisan calls to reform arbitration
laws to exempt sexual harassment claims, and every attorney general in the
United States asked Congress to end mandatory arbitration for such claims. 100
Bills, with bipartisan support, were introduced in Congress to limit the use of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 101 Moreover, because of more public

96

Id.
Id.
98
For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court misleadingly
quotes Section 2 of the FAA by omitting a key limitation in the FAA concerning disputes “arising out of such
contract,” thereby changing and expanding the coverage of the FAA to apply to disputes that do not arise out of
a contract, such as tort disputes or statutory claims. 473 U.S. at 625. A policy goal of docket-clearing probably
motivated the Court in Mitsubishi and similar cases to expand the FAA. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, if one
follows the directive of the Court in New Prime, the Court should not use a desire to advance policy goals to
“pave over” or rewrite the text of a statute. New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543. Similarly, in Southland Corp v. Keating,
the Court relied on “a national policy favoring arbitration” to find that the FAA controlled in both state and
federal courts. 465 U.S. 1, 10, 16 (1984). However, the Southland Court ignored the integrated, unitary nature
of the FAA and the FAA’s clear references to federal courts. Id. at 22. See also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (party may
petition “any United States district court” for an order compelling arbitration); id. §§ 7, 10.
99
Widespread sexual harassment allegedly occurred at the nationwide chain of jewelry stores, Jared and
Kay Jewelers, and one of the attorneys for the victims explained: “Most of them [the victim-employees] had no
way of knowing that the others had similar disputes, because that was all kept confidential.” See Yuki Noguchi,
No Class Action: Supreme Court Weighs Whether Workers Must Face Arbitrations Alone, NPR (Oct. 6, 2017,
4:22
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/06/555862822/no-class-action-supreme-court-weighs-whetherworkers-must-face-arbitrations-alon.
100
Jacqueline Thomsen, AGs Demand Congress End Mandatory Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Cases,
HILL (Feb. 13, 2018 6:33 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/administration/373715-all-us-ags-demandcongress-end-mandatory-arbitration-in-sexual.
101
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017).
97
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awareness of arbitration and stronger calls for change, high-profile employers
like Google and Uber engaged in efforts to curtail their use of arbitration
agreements in the workplace. 102
Our government’s relationship with pre-dispute arbitration agreements, as
expressed through law, has changed over time, from judicial hostility before the
1920s, 103 to a neutral acceptance during the 1920s with the enactment of the
FAA, 104 to a broad embrace during the 1980s and following years through
expansive, pro-arbitration interpretations of the FAA. 105 Perhaps the Court’s
infatuation with arbitration has hit its apogee and is beginning to stall—or swing
in the other direction. The current climate may have caused the Justices to
reconsider their expansive views of the FAA.
The confirmation hearings of Justice Brett Kavanaugh occurred right before
the oral argument in New Prime, which took place during the first week of the
Court’s October 2018 Term. 106 The first phase of Kavanaugh’s contentious
confirmation hearings occurred earlier in September 2018, with a fifth day of
unprecedented, explosive, dramatic, tearful, and angry testimony involving
Kavanaugh and Dr. Christine Blasey Ford on September 27, 2018. 107 With the
allegations that Kavanaugh had sexually assaulted Blasey Ford, issues regarding
the #MeToo movement and related accountability became part of the intensity
of these confirmation hearings 108 Kavanaugh’s partisan outbursts during the
hearings were so strong that they prompted Professor Lawrence Tribe to author
an op-ed explaining that Justice Kavanaugh may have to recuse himself in

102
See, e.g., Marrian Zhou & Richard Nieva, Google Will End Forced Arbitration for Employees, CNET
(Feb. 21, 2019, 4:45 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-will-reportedly-end-forced-arbitration-foremployees/.
103
See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1007–08 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
104
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). A House Report explained that the sole purpose of the FAA was to reverse
the old judicial hostility against arbitration agreements and make such agreements enforceable, like any other
contract: “Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of [the FAA] is simply to make
the contracting party live up to his agreement.” H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
105
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
106
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019) (No. 17340).
107
Richard Wolf, ‘Calculated Political Hit’: Brett Kavanaugh Says Accusations Rooted in Anger over
Trump, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/27/brett-kavanaugh-testifiesafter-christine-fords-assault-allegations/1442762002/ (last updated Sept. 27, 2018, 7:29 PM).
108
Kate Zernike & Emily Steel, Kavanaugh Battle Shows the Power, and the Limits, of #MeToo
Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/us/politics/kavanaugh-blaseymetoo-supreme-court.html.
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several cases because of the “blatant partisanship and personal animosity” he
displayed during the hearings. 109 Against the backdrop of the contentious
Kavanaugh hearings—just a few days before the opening of the Court’s new
Term—perhaps the Justices felt a need to avoid accusations of partisanship in
their decisions. The Court’s prior FAA decisions, such as Southland Corp. v.
Keating and Circuit City, can certainly be criticized as illegitimate,
unconstitutional rulings that rewrite the statute enacted by Congress. And they
can be attacked as the result of the Justices’ partisan views—and indeed,
partisanship may never completely disappear from judicial decision-making.
But, as recognized by some Court-watchers, the contentious confirmation
hearings of Justice Kavanaugh may have caused Chief Justice Roberts and
others to shift some of their views more towards the center and issue more
moderate, restrained decisions, at least in the near future, to protect the
legitimacy of the Court. 110
The New Prime decision was also issued in the midst of a polarized society
and the unorthodox, controversial presidency of Donald Trump, who has leveled
attacks against the judiciary. After the oral argument but before the Court issued
its decision in New Prime, Chief Justice Roberts issued a public rebuke of the
President’s attacks that the judiciary was filled with “Obama judges,” “Clinton
judges,” and “Bush judges.” 111 Given the attacks of Trump and in the wake of
the confirmation hearings of Justice Kavanaugh, the Justices may have been
more sensitive to allegations about partisanship and the lack of independence of
the judiciary when they were considering and deliberating the New Prime case.
Perhaps wanting to avoid a split along partisan lines, the Justices may have tried
harder in New Prime, as compared to prior FAA cases, to construe and apply the
FAA as originally written by Congress. One can easily criticize the last several
decades of FAA decisions as involving partisan rulings, 112 but such a critique
cannot stand against the New Prime decision.

109

Tribe, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, The Hidden Silver Lining if Kavanaugh Is Confirmed,
WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-hidden-silver-lining-if-kavanaughis-confirmed/2018/10/05/fc2d7fb6-c8ce-11e8-b2b5-79270f9cce17_story.html.
111
Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of ‘Obama Judge,’ Chief Justice Roberts Defends
Judiciary as ‘Independent’, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rebukingtrumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/2018/11/21/6383c7
b2-edb7-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html.
112
See generally, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (5–3 opinion); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (5–4 opinion); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (5–3 opinion).
110
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C. New Prime and Looking Ahead to the Future
Looking ahead to the future, New Prime can help solve some problems
involving the FAA, as well as raise fundamental questions about America’s
justice system. First, New Prime suggests a new approach courts may use to finetune the existing legal framework of the FAA. Second, this final section about
the future discusses how New Prime raises larger questions about which workers
are exempt from the coverage of the FAA, and several types of workers in the
gig economy could be impacted. Third, this Essay concludes by examining
fundamental questions raised by New Prime, like what the future role of
arbitration in America’s civil justice system should be, whether Congress should
curb the use of arbitration, access to justice, and federalism.
1. Using New Prime to Fine-Tune the FAA’s Legal Framework
The FAA is now nearly 100 years old, and it is badly in need of reform.
Because the statute is relatively short and was originally designed for a much
more limited scope of arbitration than seen today, lower courts have issued
conflicting decisions when interpreting the FAA. This confusion in arbitration
law is disappointing, because a policy objective of this area of law should be the
efficient resolution of disputes. However, the FAA cannot properly operate as a
statute that smoothly facilitates arbitration if there is continued litigation and
conflicting decisions over the FAA’s meaning or standards. The New Prime
decision suggests a new approach courts could use when resolving these
conflicting decisions and fine-tuning arbitration law.
As explained above, the Court in New Prime adopted a literalist, originalist,
and more comprehensive approach when interpreting the FAA. 113 Looking
forward, courts can use this approach to address ongoing controversies in
arbitration law. To help illustrate this approach, this section addresses some
examples of confusion in arbitration law in light of New Prime.
One area of confusion involves pre-hearing discovery. Section 7 of the FAA
provides arbitrators with subpoena power over third parties, and courts can hold
such persons in contempt if they refuse to honor the arbitrator’s subpoenas. 114
However, there is confusion regarding the subpoena power. Some courts, like
the Third Circuit, construe the subpoena power narrowly to only cover testimony
from third parties at the live merits hearings before an arbitration panel. 115 Other
113
114
115

See supra notes 80–93 and accompanying text.
9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 2004). This particular opinion
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courts, like the Eighth Circuit, construe the subpoena power expansively to
cover not only testimony from third parties at the arbitral hearings but also prehearing discovery from third parties. 116
The approach adopted in New Prime suggests how courts should resolve this
split involving subpoena power. Under a textualist, statutory originalist
approach, the Third Circuit’s narrow, more limited view of the subpoena power
is correct. Broad pre-hearing discovery did not really exist when the FAA was
enacted in 1925; this kind of discovery was one of the landmark changes arising
from the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 117 Further,
the FAA’s text provides that the arbitrators “may summon in writing any person
to attend before them,” 118 and physical presence before the arbitrators likely
describes attendance at the hearings, where the arbitrators would be present.
Therefore, under an originalist approach to statutory interpretation, courts
should construe Section 7 of the FAA as limited to subpoenas for providing
testimony at the hearings, not pre-hearing discovery. In fact, then-Judge Alito,
who wrote the Third Circuit opinion adopting the narrow view, criticized the
Eighth Circuit’s expansive view of Section 7. Alito pointed out that the Eighth
Circuit was improperly using its own policy preferences to override the clear
text of the statute, 119 a concern addressed in New Prime. 120
Courts are also split as to the meaning of the term “arbitration,” which is not
defined anywhere in the FAA. Some courts view arbitration under the FAA as
requiring a binding process, 121 while other courts are willing to classify
nonbinding procedures as arbitration under the FAA. 122 The approach used by
the Court in New Prime also suggests a solution for this conflict. New Prime
suggests that the different provisions of the FAA should be construed as a
unitary, comprehensive whole. 123 Under this approach, the FAA carefully

was authored by then-Judge Samuel Alito. Id. at 404.
116
In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2000).
117
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998) (“Prior to [the adoption of] the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure [in 1938], discovery in civil cases in federal court was severely limited. The Federal Rules discovery
provisions dramatically increased the potential for discovery.”).
118
9 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added).
119
Hay Grp., Inc., 360 F.3d at 406, 410.
120
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 543 (2019).
121
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 372–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting application of the FAA to a
nonbinding dispute resolution process because the FAA “applies only to binding proceedings likely to
realistically settle the dispute”).
122
Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the FAA covers
nonbinding procedures).
123
See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
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regulates all aspects of arbitration proceedings, including the beginning, 124
middle, 125 and end of a proceeding; 126 the FAA envisions a process that will
result in a final award that can be confirmed and entered as a court judgment. 127
This comprehensive framework, which is consistent with the comprehensive
interpretive approach adopted in New Prime, suggests that the FAA was
designed to cover binding procedures that could result in an award that would
be entered as a final court judgment. 128
There are many other conflicting judicial decisions involving the FAA. 129
Looking ahead to the future, courts may resolve these conflicting decisions by
using the textualist, originalist, and comprehensive approach from New
Prime. 130
2. Whom Does the FAA Cover?
New Prime clarifies that for purposes of the transportation worker exemption
in the FAA, whether the worker is an employee or independent contractor is
irrelevant. 131 But New Prime leaves unanswered deeper questions about who
counts as a transportation worker. Some courts have required that a worker
literally cross state lines to trigger the exemption. 132 Other courts have rejected
this requirement, and have suggested that local postal workers and managers of
124

9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2012).
Id. § 7.
126
Id. §§ 9, 10.
127
Id. § 9.
128
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 371–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the FAA applies to proceedings
that result in a final, binding resolution of a dispute).
129
See, e.g., Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the
uncertainty and confusion involving the manifest disregard standard for vacatur of arbitral awards); Montez v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The absence of a consensus on the meaning of ‘evident
partiality’ [for vacatur] is evidenced by the approaches adopted by the different circuits.”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1051–52 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting conflicting views about the
availability of preliminary injunctive relief from a court in aid of arbitration).
130
Although the Court in New Prime adopted a textualist approach and appeared to reject policy-driven
arguments in connection with the FAA, a purported policy of promoting efficiency seems to have driven a
majority of the Justices in the Court’s most recent decision in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela. No. 17-988, 2019 WL
1780275 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2019). The Court in Lamps Plus held that an ambiguous arbitration agreement cannot
provide the required contractual basis for compelling class arbitration. Id. at *9. In reaching its holding, the
majority relied on a policy-driven argument that class arbitration would sacrifice the efficiency and speed of
bilateral arbitration. Id. at *7–8. The Author suspects that the majority’s opinion in Lamps Plus is probably not
really about the FAA or arbitration at all, and instead, is more about the majority’s dislike for class procedures.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will use a more textualist approach when interpreting the FAA in future cases, as
long as class proceedings are not involved, and lower courts may also use New Prime’s textualist approach when
interpreting the FAA.
131
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 544 (2019).
132
Levin v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that local delivery drivers
do not qualify for the transportation worker exemption).
125
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interstate truckers may be covered. 133 For example, in American Postal Workers
Union, AFL–CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
postal workers are covered by the exemption: “[I]f any workers are ‘actually
engaged in interstate commerce,’ the instant postal workers are. They are
responsible for dozens, if not hundreds, of items of mail moving in ‘interstate
commerce’ on a daily basis. Indeed, without them, ‘interstate commerce,’ as we
know it today, would scarcely be possible.” 134
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit found that this exemption covered a distributor
at a local mail center who apparently did not cross state lines. 135 Although some
postal workers would likely cross state lines when driving a truck carrying mail
from one state to another—like Mr. Oliveira, an interstate trucker hauling
freight—some courts have held that local postal workers involved in the process
are also covered by the exemption. 136 With today’s e-commerce economy, if
anyone is involved in the interstate transport of goods, wouldn’t drivers,
warehouse workers, and perhaps other employees at Amazon qualify? Amazon
is one of the largest companies in the world, with a massive, comprehensive
logistics network facilitating deliveries all around the country and world.137
Massive, vertically integrated, corporate behemoths like Amazon may take on
certain features of the traditional transportation industry and arguably may
qualify for the transportation worker exemption. 138 As Professors Richard Bales
and Lise Gelernter have pointed out, there is uncertainty whether Uber and Lyft
drivers in today’s gig economy would qualify for the transportation worker
exemption, and the Supreme Court may ultimately have to engage in sharper
line drawing and revisit its holding in Circuit City, 139 which judicially created
the transportation worker exemption. 140

133
See, e.g., Zamora v. Swift Transp. Corp., No. EP-07-CA-00400-KC, 2008 WL 2369769, at *7–8 (W.D.
Tex. June 3, 2008) (holding that supervisory manager for interstate trucking company qualifies for the
transportation worker exemption).
134
823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 1987).
135
Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988).
136
Id.; Am. Postal Workers Union, 823 F.2d at 473.
137
Eytan Buchman, The Rise of Amazon Logistics, TRANSP. TOPICS (Aug. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.ttnews.com/articles/rise-amazon-logistics. See generally Amazon, AMAZON, https://logistics.
amazon.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019);
138
See Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C16-1554-JCC, 2019 WL 1777725, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
23, 2019) (Amazon delivery drivers qualify for the FAA’s transportation worker exemption under the rationale
of New Prime).
139
Rick Bales, “New Prime” and the Gig Economy, U. MO. SCH. L.: ARB. INFO, http://law.missouri.edu/
arbitrationinfo/new-prime-gig-economy/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019); see also Lise Gelernter, U. MO. SCH. L.:
ARB. INFO, “New Prime” and the Viability of State Arbitration Acts, http://law.missouri.edu/arbitrationinfo/
new-prime-viability-state-arbitration-acts/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
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3. New Prime Raises Fundamental Questions About the Future Role of
Arbitration in America’s Civil Justice System
Looking forward, the New Prime decision raises a technical, focused
question about the future role of state law in regulating arbitration agreements
involving transportation workers. This narrow question, in turn, then raises a
more fundamental, broader question about the continued expansive use of
arbitration in America’s civil justice system. In New Prime, the Court held that
the FAA does not cover transportation workers, whether the worker is an
independent contractor or an employee. 141 It is clear that arbitration agreements
involving transportations workers cannot be enforced pursuant to the FAA.
However, this holding raises a technical, narrow question: can such arbitration
agreements involving transportation workers be enforced under state laws,
perhaps state arbitration laws or state contract laws? The Third Circuit, more
than a decade before New Prime, held that such agreements can be. 142 But New
Prime suggests this approach may be flawed.
One view, expressed by the Third Circuit in Palcko v. Airborne Express,
Inc., is that the transportation worker exemption does not preempt state
arbitration laws. 143 In other words, if the FAA’s transportation worker
exemption is triggered, an arbitration agreement may still be fully enforceable
under state arbitration laws or state contract laws. According to the court, if an
agreement falls within the scope of the Section 1 exemption, then, for that
agreement, it is “as if the FAA had never been enacted.” 144 As a result, state law
can then fill the gap, and states are free to choose whether to enforce such an
agreement. Under this view, transportation workers must now consult state laws
to determine whether their arbitration agreements are enforceable.
However, the New Prime Court suggests a different framework that would
preempt any state law purporting to enforce a transportation worker’s arbitration
agreement. According to the New Prime Court, “Sections 1, 2, and 3 [and 4] are
integral parts of a whole, [and Sections] 1 and 2 define the field in which
Congress was legislating.” 145 One must construe the statute as an integrated,
interwoven whole, so that the principles of Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA should
be construed together. Under this reading, the exclusion regarding transportation

employment disputes. See generally SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE, supra note 51.
141
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 543–44 (2019).
142
Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2004).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 538; see supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
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workers is part and parcel of Section 2’s directive to enforce arbitration
agreements, and the concepts embodied in Section 1 are interwoven and
inseparable from the concepts in Section 2. Thus, in passing the FAA, Congress
declared a principle that all arbitration agreements, except for those involving
transportation workers, are fully binding. Courts must enforce all arbitration
agreements, but not those involving transportation workers.
In its sweeping Southland decision in 1984, a deeply flawed decision but
nevertheless governing law, the Supreme Court held that Section 2’s directive
applies in state court and overrides conflicting state laws. 146 Because Section 2’s
principles are inextricably interwoven with those of Section 1 according to New
Prime, 147 it appears that state courts must enforce all arbitration agreements
except those of transportation workers, contrary to the earlier view of the Third
Circuit. The combined punch of Sections 1 and 2, which are interwoven sections
that cannot be read separately, overrides conflicting state laws. Under this
interpretation of the FAA, and accepting the flawed Southland decision as
governing law, as we must, one could argue that as a matter of federal,
preemptive law, states must generally enforce arbitration agreements, but
arbitration agreements involving transportation workers are unenforceable. As a
result—and contrary to the view of the Third Circuit in the older Palcko
case 148—the FAA would preempt any state laws declaring enforceable
arbitration agreements of transportation workers. Lower courts, and eventually
perhaps the Supreme Court, will have to sort out these issues and whether the
Third Circuit’s Palcko decision is good law in light of New Prime. 149
At a deeper, more fundamental level, the New Prime Court’s
conceptualization of the FAA as involving an integrated statute raises the
question of the continued validity or constitutionality of the Court’s infamous
Southland decision. 150 If we take the New Prime majority at its word, and if
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 are integral parts of a whole and must be read together,
this view casts serious doubts on the continued validity of Southland. Sections
3 and 4 refer to federal courts and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 151 which
suggests that Sections 1 and 2 are also designed solely for federal courts. Indeed,
the evidence and arguments are overwhelming that Congress intended the FAA

146

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 538.
148
Palcko, 372 F.3d at 596.
149
Id.
150
Southland, 465 U.S. 1.
151
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (“courts of the United States”); id. § 4 (“any United States district court” and the
“Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
147
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to apply solely in federal court. 152 Southland and its progeny, like the Preston
case and its displacement of a state agency’s authority over issues of state law, 153
represent unconstitutional deprivations of state power. The New Prime Court has
set up a potential showdown for deciding the continued validity of Southland.
Currently, arbitration agreements are enforceable everywhere in America and
for virtually every type of claim, in both state and federal courts, pursuant to the
Court’s broad interpretations of the FAA. 154 However, if Southland is overruled
and the FAA becomes applicable solely in federal court, states would be free to
enforce or not enforce arbitration agreements. The FAA’s role would then shrink
and only cover the arbitration of disputes that trigger the limited subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and increased opportunities for state regulation
of arbitration would occur. Increased state regulation of arbitration could in turn
enhance the values of federalism and allow for more experimentation with
arbitration. 155 Thus, at a deeper level, New Prime raises questions about the
future role and regulation of arbitration in America’s entire civil justice system,
both federal and state.
The broader policy issues raised by New Prime involve an ongoing, larger
arbitration debate in America: are there certain disputes that we deem to be
inappropriate for arbitration? The pendulum has shifted to broad, sweeping
acceptance of arbitration so that virtually every matter can be arbitrated. But it
seems like American society, both through private initiatives and proposals in
Congress, 156 is at a crossroads, looking forward to possible future paths, where
we can fine-tune the legal framework for arbitration to perhaps limit its uses.
Limiting arbitration does not necessarily mean a return to an old distrust of
arbitrators or arbitration in general. Arbitrators strive as much as any judge to
do what is right and fair under the law, and arbitration enables parties to realize
certain values, such as efficiency, speed, finality, and expertise in dispute
resolution. Instead of framing this larger debate in terms of hostility towards
arbitration, the debate over the scope of the FAA is best framed by asking
whether there are other values society wishes to emphasize for particular claims,
by ensuring the judiciary’s ability to adjudicate them. For example, a society
may decide that the values of finality, speed, and efficiency are appropriate for
most disputes, but not as pressing for others. Perhaps we as a society want
victims of certain wrongdoing—like sexual or racial harassment or

152
153
154
155
156

MACNEIL, supra note 52.
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008).
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 121 (2013).
See supra Section II.B.
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discrimination—to feel respected and heard in a public forum by a jury of peers
and a government representative serving as a judge. Such a system, although
arguably more cumbersome, provides extra procedural protections such as broad
discovery and broad appellate rights to ensure that a correct, fair judgment has
been issued.
CONCLUSION
Compared to the last several decades of Supreme Court decisions involving
the FAA, New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira is a landmark case for rejecting an
expansive interpretation of the statute and ruling in favor of workers. Using New
Prime as a lens into the past, present, and future, one can see a panoptic view of
the development of arbitration law and the role of arbitration within our broader
legal system. The expansive growth of the legal framework for arbitration, a
growth resulting mainly from the policy driven, flawed holdings of prior
Supreme Court cases, represents one of the most far-reaching and transformative
legal developments in American history because of the potential impact of
arbitration on virtually every area of law. Moving forward, it is my hope that the
Supreme Court will follow the more restrained interpretative approach it used in
New Prime and not apply its own policy choices in the larger debate about
arbitration. Instead, the Supreme Court should apply the limited statute Congress
originally adopted in 1925 and let the American people debate and decide the
appropriate role of arbitration in our broader legal system.

